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Executive summary  
This paper formulated in the context of the Indian experience in regionalism. In the past 
decade, India’s trade policy has seen a marked shift towards regionalism with the signing of many 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). As of May 2011, 13 RTAs were in force, with at least eight more 
under negotiations. This paper explores whether these RTAs were ultimately of use to Indian traders. 
To assess the usefulness of an RTA to traders, percentage ratios, like utilization, product-coverage and 
utility ratios, are generally calculated. Use of these ratios has been boosted by United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) assessment of the use of Generalized Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP) tariff preferences by developing countries. However, the lack of data in official 
statistics on India’s preferential trade limits the use of this methodology here. Thus, this paper 
explores an alternative route to find utility of RTAs to the traders. 
 
First, using available official trade statistics, aggregate trade trends are compared with trends 
in trade of preferential items for each RTA; the gap between the two gives an idea of the extent of 
importance of preferences in trading with the RTA partners,. Next, a primary survey of certifying 
agencies, undertaken to find out the level of utilization of preferential schemes by Indian exporters, is 
reviewed. The results show that after the RTAs came into effect, both exports and imports from the 
RTA partners increased significantly. However, an interesting contrast was found amid preferential 
exports and imports; while preferential imports were the driving force behind the substantial increase 
in total imports from the RTA partners, preferential exports – despite increases in value – could not 
explain the level of increase in total exports to RTA partners. This indicates that non-preferential 
items accounted for much of the increase in post-RTA exports. Therefore, the RTAs per se cannot be 
said to have greatly benefited Indian exporters. 
 
From the primary survey three main points emerge: 
(a) GSP is a better utilized preference scheme than all of India’s RTAs put together; 
(b) Among the RTAs, most Certificates of Origin (CoO) are issued under the India-Sri Lanka 
Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA), implying that exporters are using ISFTA more than the 
other RTAs. Given the wide coverage under this Agreement, this is understandable; 
however, when compared with overall exports to Sri Lanka, only 11 per cent of total 
export transactions to Sri Lanka in 2008-2009 were issued with CoO. This tallies with the 
low utilization of preferential schemes seen in other RTAs among developing countries; 
(c) Rules of origin (RoO) maybe a culprit with regard to the low level of utilization as it was 
found from the survey that when there is more than one RTA available for exporting to a 


















The world trading system has witnessed an increasing number of regional integration 
initiatives in recent times. The basic premise of such initiatives is to liberalize trade among the 
members by granting tariff concessions for, or eliminations of selected products. Regional integration 
initiatives can be of various types, depending on their degree of integration: 
(a)  Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) form the first tier arrangement, where trading 
partners grant partial tariff reductions to each other; 
(b)  The second tier is the free trade agreement/area (FTA), in which members eliminate all 
tariffs among themselves, but with each member retaining its own tariff rates on imports 
from non-members; 
(c)  Third, members of a customs union (CU) set a common level of tariffs vis-à-vis non-
members; 
(d)  The fourth tier is a common market, which also allows free movement of factors of 
production; 
(e)  The last tier is the economic union, which involves integrating national economic policies 
and adopting a common currency. 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) uses the umbrella term of RTA for all such initiatives. 
The welfare effects of RTAs are traditionally ascertained using trade creation/trade diversion analyses 
(Viner, 1950). However, theoretical and empirical research has not been able to provide a clear 
answer as to whether RTAs are necessarily welfare-augmenting (more trade-creating than trade-
diverting). Meade (1955), Lipsey (1970) and Summers (1991) showed instances of trade-creating 
RTAs whereas Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) provided 
examples of trade-diverting RTAs. 
 
Opinions are also divided among economists as to whether RTAs are “building blocks” or 
“stumbling blocks” with respect to multilateral trade liberalization under WTO, the essential question 
that was posed first in Bhagwati (1991). As Baldwin (1997) noted, the debate on RTAs may be 
divided between the Larry Summers school (Summers, 1991) and the Jagadish Bhagwati school 
(Bhagwati and Krueger 1995); the former school looks at regional (i.e., discriminatory) liberalization 
and sees only liberalization, whereas the latter school sees only discrimination. Despite the debate, 
RTAs are the current reality of the global trading order with all but two members of WTO (Mauritania 
and Mongolia) being engaged in at least one regional integration initiative. Keeping this recent march 
of regionalism as its backdrop, this study attempts to deal with the essential question: “Are the RTAs 
of use to traders?” 
 
The paper is made in the context of the Indian experience in regionalism. In the past decade, 
India’s trade policy has seen a marked shift towards regionalism with the signing of numerous RTAs. 
Thirteen RTAs are in force and at least eight more are under negotiation. This paper attempts to find 
the answer to whether such RTAs have ultimately been of use to Indian traders. In order to ascertain 
the usefulness of an RTA to traders, percentage ratios, (like utilization, product-coverage and utility 
ratios) are generally calculated (Inama 2003; and Candau, Fontagne and Jean, 2004). The use of these 
ratios has been boosted by UNCTAD assessment of the use of Generalized Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP)
1 tariff preferences by developing countries. However, the lack of data in official trade statistics 
on India’s preferential trade limited the use of this methodology in this study. Firm-level studies have 
been conducted by a few authors on the use of RTAs (Takahashi and Urata, 2010; and Kawai and 
Wignaraja 2010). However, since firm-specific surveys are outside the scope of this paper an alternate 
route has been used in finding the utility of RTAs to the traders. Using available official trade 
statistics, this paper first compares aggregate trade trends with trends in trade of preferential items for 
                                                            
1 GSP schemes are trade preference provision schemes whereby developed countries unilaterally grant tariff preferences to 
developing and least developed countries.  
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each RTA; the gap between the two gives an idea of the extent of the importance of preferences in 
trading with the RTA partners. 
 
Second, a primary survey of certifying agencies on the utilization of preferential schemes by 
Indian exporters is reviewed. With regard to the utilization of RTAs by importers, the required 
information from the Indian Customs was unavailable. However, some earlier studies that assessed 
the use of RTAs by exporters in India’s RTA partners, especially Sri Lanka (de Mel, Jayaratne and 
Premaratne, 2011), reflect utilization from the perspective of Indian importers. Thus, this paper 
focuses on the utility of RTAs from the Indian exporters’ perspective only. Section A gives a brief 
review of literature on RTAs. Section B details India’s initiatives in regionalism. Section C gives the 
methodology and section D presents the results. In conclusion, taking into consideration the results, 
section E considers the utility of RTAs from an Indian perspective. 
 
A. RTAs and their effects: A brief review 
 
A striking development in the recent history of the world trading system has been the 
unprecedented surge in RTAs. Figure 1 shows the significant increase in the number of RTAs 
entering into force from the mid-1990s. The continuity of such a trend in recent years is also clear 
from the figure. Prior to the mid-1990s, in some years only a few RTAs came into force, while in 
many years no new RTAs came into force. The WTO database on RTAs
2 states that between the 
inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) up to the establishment of WTO 
(i.e., from 1948 to 1994), GATT received 123 notifications of RTAs, which covered mainly trade in 
goods. In contrast since the creation of WTO in 1995, more than 300 additional arrangements 
covering trade in goods and/or services have been notified.  
 
The regionalism of the 1990s is referred to as the second wave of regional initiatives, or “new 
regionalism”, to distinguish it from the first round of RTA formations that occurred as after-effects of 
the European Economic Community (EEC), that was established in 1957. The inception of the EEC 
led to signing of a few RTAs in Africa and Latin America from the 1960s to the 1980s, but the EEC 
remained the only successful regional integration initiative until the mid-1990s, when another wave of 
regionalism occurred, as shown in figure 1. In addition, most of the Agreements notified to WTO in 
1970s and 1980s were those in the European Community
3 enlargement notifications. The “new 
regionalism” of the 1990s differed from the first wave of regionalism as it went beyond the tariff 
preference exchanges in goods, as it covered the entire globe rather than just Western Europe, and had 
a growing interregional dimension as many of the RTAs were no longer between countries of the 
same region (Busse and Koopmann, 2002). 
 
There are, in general, three objectives for forging regional alliances: 
(a) To promote economic cooperation among countries forging such alliances; 
(b) To build a sense of security in order to facilitate political harmony within a region;  
(c) To enable the countries concerned to achieve international competitiveness in the current 
era of globalization. 
 
Although these objectives provide a politico-economic rationale for establishing RTAs, they 
cannot explain why there has been a sudden spurt in such agreements across the world as is evident 
from Figure 1. According to many economists, such as Bhagwati (1994), Krugman (1993) and 
Panagariya (1999), the proliferation of RTAs in recent years was due to the slow progress of 
GATT/WTO, as witnessed by the long-drawn out rounds as well as the bitterness in negotiating issues 
                                                            
2 WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), available at 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx  (accessed 30 April 2010). 





between the developed and developing nations, as seen in the Doha Development Round. This may 
have led to the forging of more regional partnerships to liberalize trade in recent times. Baldwin 
(1997) refuted this argument that the “new regionalism” has stemmed from frustrating WTO talks by 
stating that it was the regionalism in the European Community and the United States of America that 
actually had a “domino effect” in getting other countries to follow suit. Countries do not want to be 
left out of the RTA process as they fear that they will otherwise lose out on market access. So slow 
progress under GATT/WTO is not the catalyst for the “new regionalism”, as GATT/WTO rounds 
have traditionally been long-drawn out; rather, a “domino effect” explains the new drive towards the 
growth in regional initiatives. 
 


























Source: Author’s calculation, based on the WTO RTA-IS database. 
Note: 1958 – EEC comes into effect; 1973 – first EEC enlargement with the inclusion of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and other countries; 1981 – second 
EEC enlargement with the inclusion of Greece; the third and fourth enlargements in 1986 and 
1995; the fifth and last enlargement in 2004. 
 
The traditional theory of gains from free trade suggests that the removal of trade barriers 
allows consumers and producers to purchase from the cheapest and most competitive sources of 
supply. This enhances efficiency and increases welfare. Following this logic, it was traditionally 
believed that regional trade blocs should generate gains from trade as and when member countries 
eliminated trade barriers among themselves. However, studies carried out in this area have found that 
RTAs do not necessarily result in welfare gains either for all the members or for the world as a whole. 
Viner (1950) introduced the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion, and showed that the net 
welfare effect of trade liberalization on a regional basis was not unambiguously positive. He pointed 
out that RTAs could lead to trade creation if, due to the formation of a regional agreement, the 
members switched from inefficient domestic producers and imported more from efficient producers of 
other RTA members. In this case, efficiency gains arise from both production efficiency and 
consumption efficiency. On the other hand, trade diversion takes place if, because of the RTA, 
members switch imports from low-cost producers in the rest of the world to higher-cost producers  
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within the region. Trade diversion lowers welfare of not only the RTA countries but also that of the 
rest of the world. 
 
There is a major ongoing debate among the trade theorists and empiricists about the relative 
dominance of these two effects. Some studies have shown that the balance between trade creation and 
trade diversion is more likely to favour trade creation (a) when MFN tariffs before the formation of 
RTAs are low (Meade, 1955); or (b) if member countries of an RTA are already large trading partners 
(Lipsey 1970); or (c) transportation costs are low (Summers, 1991). However, Grossman and 
Helpman (1995) claimed that the formation of trade-diverting RTAs was the most likely case as 
viability of a potential FTA increases only with enhanced protection for most domestic sectors. Also, 
according to Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), if members of an RTA are small in relation to the 
outside world, very little trade creation will take place and trade diversion is likely to be the more 
dominant effect. Existing empirical studies do not provide any definite conclusion on the net welfare 
effect (Pomfret, 1988). The World Trade Report (2003) stated that the evidence drawn from 
econometric analysis produced different results for different RTAs in this regard and that a general 
conclusion could therefore not be drawn.  
 
The effects of RTAs have also been analyzed using gravity models. The results have 
generally shown an increase in bilateral trade due to RTAs (Frankel, 1997; Soloaga and Winters, 
2001; Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann, 2003; Feenstra, 2004; and Bergstrand, Egger and 
Larch, 2007). The gravity model of trade predicts bilateral trade flows based on the economic sizes 
(GDP) of two countries and the distance between them. Policy variables such as RTAs are introduced 
as dummy variables in order to find their effects on bilateral trade. Gravity modeling of trade, though 
popular, has theoretical issues. With the advent of multi-country, multi-sector computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models, techniques available for analyzing RTAs have improved substantially. 
These models can be used to predict the impact of an RTA on an economy-wide basis: they can 
evaluate the production, employment, consumption, trade, price and welfare effects of the formation 
or the expansion of an RTA. The general conclusion from studies using CGE models is that formation 
of an RTA leads to more trade creation than trade diversion and that welfare effects increase for all 
members of an RTA (Robinson and Thierfelder, 2002). Again, however, there is an ongoing debate on 
the use of CGE models for studying RTAs as such models have poor econometric foundations 
(Hertel, and others 2007). 
 
Utilization of tariff preferences by firms is an area where some empirical work on regional 
integration has been presented recently in the literature. When preferential trade data are available, 
utilization by exporters can be easily found, using the percentage ratios mentioned above (product-
coverage, utilization and utility ratios). For example, Cadot and others (2002) calculated the average 
utilization rate for NAFTA in 2000 and found it to be 64 per cent. Inama (2003) calculated utilization 
of GSP schemes by using the same percentage ratios and found that only 39 per cent of eligible 
products entered the Quad countries
4 from developing beneficiary nations under GSP. 
 
Primary surveys have also been undertaken by some authors to ascertain use of RTAs by 
traders. Those studies found that utilization of most RTAs involving developing countries was much 
lower compared to developed country RTAs; for example, between 17 per cent and 25 per cent of the 
firms in South-East Asia use FTAs (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010), while between 12 per cent and 33 
per cent of Japanese companies use the various FTAs with the developing countries (Takahashi and 
Urata, 2010). Almost all the studies point to the restrictive role of Rules of Origin (RoO), which they 
say deters the use of RTAs. RoO are the requirements that a product must satisfy in order to be 
eligible for being declared as “originating” in a beneficiary country. If a traded product contains 
imported components, there are three general rules for determining “origin” – (a) change in tariff 
classification, (b) local value-added and/or (c) a technical rule. These rules are negotiated during the 
                                                            
4 Quad countries is the term used by WTO to refer to the four major industrialized economies, i.e., the United States, 




drawing up of an RTA, and different combinations of such rules can be found in RTAs around the 
world. They are designed to support a commercial policy; however, because of the way in which they 
have evolved, they have become commercial policy instruments in themselves (Vermulst and Waer, 
1990). Krueger (1993), Palmeter (1993), Estevadeordal (2000), Brenton and Manchin (2003), and 
Krishna (2005), among others, described the role of RoO in RTAs. 
 
Both at the theoretical and empirical level, economists are divided over the desirability of 
RTAs in a multilateral trade regime. Some envisage RTAs as “stumbling-blocks” to multilateral trade 
liberalization whereas others contend that they can act as “building-blocks”, terminology introduced 
by Bhagwati (1991). Even after many years of debate, no consensus has been reached on this issue. 
As Herrmann (2008) noted “...it seems that even from a purely economic perspective – which is not 
necessarily best suited or conclusive for all problems of international political economy – no clear-cut 
case can be made for or against RTAs with regard to their impact on welfare and multilateral 
institutions”. Herrmann also stated that each RTA would be different and hence should be assessed on 
its own. Thus, for this study, each of India’s RTAs were analyzed to ascertain their effects on bilateral 
trade. Both secondary data sources and a primary survey were used to  determine the use of RTAs by 
exporters, thereby contributing to the small, yet growing, literature that attempts to ascertain use of 
RTAs by traders.  
 
B. RTAs: India’s initiatives 
 
Seshadri (2009) traced the evolution of Indian RTAs, from limited scope and sometimes non-
reciprocal PTAs with developing countries (such as the PTA with Nepal) to comprehensive and 
reciprocal arrangements with developing countries (e.g., the FTA with Sri Lanka) and then to the 
recent RTAs that India has negotiated with developed countries (e.g., European Union members). 
 
The first RTA entered into by India was in 1975 when the Government signed the Bangkok 
Agreement. It started as a regional initiative between developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region 
but was very limited in its scope; in fact, it was only in 2005 that it was reincarnated as the Asia-
Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) and trade liberalization started in a meaningful way between its 
members (Bangladesh, China, India, Republic of Korea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Sri 
Lanka). Members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
5 formed a PTA 
(SAPTA) in 1995, which was another regional initiative between the nations of South Asia under the 
ambit of SAARC. It was upgraded to an FTA (SAFTA) in 2006. India’s first bilateral FTA was with 
Sri Lanka – the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA). It came into effect in March 2000. 
Subsequently, many other RTAs were signed and currently, as of May 2011, 13 are in operation. 
Annex I provides information on these RTAs. From the annex it is clear that in the past decade India 
has signed and implemented many RTAs. India is focusing on signing many more RTAs in the near 
future, particularly with its major trade partners such as the European Union and Japan. Table 1 lists 
the preferences exchanged under the bilateral RTAs covered by this study. 
 
In this policy shift towards RTAs, one worrying trend is the overlapping of such agreements. 
India’s RTA trade partners are part of more than one RTA in some cases, e.g., while trading with Sri 
Lanka there are currently four RTAs that can be used for preferential trade and if the Bay of Bengal 
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)
6 FTA comes into 
force there will be yet another RTA route for trading with Sri Lanka.  Figure 2 shows the overlap of 
                                                            
5 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka established the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) on 8 December 1985 to facilitate regional cooperation. In April 2007, at  SAARC’s fourteenth summit, 
Afghanistan became its eighth member. 
6 BIMSTEC was set up in 1997 to foster socio-economic cooperation among Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka of SAARC, and 
Thailand and Myanmar of ASEAN. Bhutan and Nepal joined the initiative in 2003. BIMSTEC is viewed as a “bridging link” 






RTAs already in operation. The “spaghetti bowl”
7 of RTAs is causing much confusion and difficulty 
among the trading community as the rules governing each RTA are different.  
 
Table 1. Tariff concessions exchanged on number of products (HS 6-digit level) 
RTA  India’s concession to partner’s 
exports 
Partner’s concession to 
India’s exports 
Sri Lanka FTA  5024  4004 
Afghanistan PTA   23  8 
Thailand FTA (EHS)
8 82  82 
Singapore CECA  5121 items (8-digit)  All items 
Chile PTA  178 items (8-digit)  296 items (8-digit) 
Source: Author’s compilation based on information available at the Ministry of Commerce website, 
http://commerce.gov.in/trade/international_ta.asp?id=2&trade=i. 
 















Source: Author’s depiction. 
 
                                                            
7 Bhagwati (1995) compared the overlapping RTAs with a “spaghetti bowl” and the complex RoO of such overlapping 
arrangements as “the mess created on the tie and shirt of the person eating the spaghetti”. 
8 The Early Harvest Scheme covers areas of economic cooperation and has a common list of items for exchange of tariff 
concessions as a confidence-building measure. 
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Since the RTAs came into force India’s trade, both exports and imports, has increased with 
most of its RTA partners, as indicated by the official trade statistics. The question here is whether 
such an increase is due to the preferences exchanged under the respective RTAs or for other reasons. 
The official trade data, available from secondary sources, does not give the amount of trade done on 
preferential basis – there are no data that show the amount of trade that occurs with CoO.
9 If this data 
were available for India’s exports and imports, the extent of utilization of preferences by traders could 
have been calculated easily and the usefulness of the RTAs to traders commented upon. In the 
absence of such data two steps were taken: (a) aggregate trends were compared with the trend in 
preferential items – the gap between the two gives an idea of the extent of importance of preferences 
in trading with the RTA partners; and (b) a primary survey of certifying agencies was undertaken to 
ascertain the utilization of preferential schemes by Indian exporters.  In the first step, the preferential 
items were noted from the RTA texts, available on the Ministry of Commerce website. In some 
agreements, such as the India-Afghanistan PTA (IAPTA), and the India-Chile PTA (ICPTA), the 
items given preferences are listed directly. In most other agreements, there is a negative list that 
includes all items not given preferences. By deducting their collective trade value from total trade, the 
value of the preferential items is arrived at. Also, the top 10 commodities, value-wise, are calculated 
at the 6-digit HS
10 level (preferences are generally exchanged at the 6-digit HS level). As trade in such 
disaggregate items fluctuates year to year, a simple average of the past three years is taken to ascertain 
the top 10 products traded with RTA partners. Whether these items are being granted preferences 
under the RTAs is ascertained next. These two exercises were carried out for India’s bilateral (and 
reciprocal) RTAs with Afghanistan, Chile, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand.  
 
The Export Inspection Council (EIC) in New Delhi is the main certifying agency for issuing 
CoO to India’s various preferential schemes. An exporter wishing to export through any of the RTAs 
needs to apply to EIC for the requisite CoO. For most of the RTAs (Sri Lanka FTA, Afghanistan 
PTA, Thailand FTA, Singapore CECA, SAFTA, MERCOSUR PTA, Republic of Korea CEPA and 
ASEAN CECA), the EIC, through its field organizations in various Indian cities, is the sole authority 
for issuing CoO. EIC was visited a number of times in order to collect the data on the annual number 
of CoO that are issued to exporters under each RTA. This number is then compared with the total 
number of transactions that exporters make annually with RTA partners. This data is collected from 
the Directorate-General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S), Calcutta. DGCI&S 
comes under the Ministry of Commerce of India, and is the official organization for collection and 
dissemination of India’s trade statistics. The number of transactions made annually by exporters with 
regard to a partner country is not available in official trade statistics. Visits to DGCI&S made it 
possible to ascertain this number for Sri Lanka. Thus, the number of transactions with CoO was 
obtained from EIC (each consignment receives with one CoO, so number of CoO issued under ISFTA 
implies the number of consignments, i.e., transactions that are going annually to Sri Lanka). Data on 
the total number of annual transactions that exporters are making with Sri Lanka were acquired from 
DGCI&S. A comparison of these two sets of numbers gives an approximate measure of the use of the 




9 To utilize preferences under any RTA the traded items need to satisfy Rules of Origin (RoO) and their exporters need to get 
a CoO from a government agency and then ship it to the importer who can then avail the lower preferential tariffs. The CoO 
states that the product shipped satisfies RoO and thereby ‘originates’ in the exporting country. It is important to help check 
trade deflection, whereby third country firms can route their products through the lowest tariff member in an RTA to other 
member markets. RoO check such simple transshipment by requiring traded products to ‘originate’ in the exporting member 
country. The rules may be a change in tariff classification or a minimum percentage of value to be added domestically or any 
other specific requirements.  
10 The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) is a coded classification of traded products that is 
managed by the World Customs Organization. The classification, which is based on the nature of the commodities, first 





Bilateral trade, in both exports and imports, with India’s RTA partners increased substantially 
after the RTAs came into effect. This can be clearly seen from figures 3 and 4.  Within three years 
after ISFTA, the first bilateral FTA for India, came into force in 2000, India’s exports to Sri Lanka 
doubled from about US$ 500 million to close to US$ 1 billion. In 2009 (i.e., 2009/10) the figure was 
close to US$ 2.1 billion. Imports from Sri Lanka, although much less in value than exports, increased 
by twelve times to reach around US$ 630 million in 2007 but then declined to US$ 390 million in 
2009. However, that drop can be explained by the global financial crisis. 
After IAPTA, exports to Afghanistan rose from a meagre US$ 25 million in 2002, a year 
before the PTA came into effect, to US$ 464 million in 2009; similarly, imports increased from 
around US$ 19 million to US$ 125 million in just six years after the PTA came into force. 
 
For the Thailand FTA, under an EHS list a total of 82 common items were made duty-free for 
bilateral trade. Exports to Thailand increased from US$ 900 million from the EHS launch in 2004 to 
US$ 1.7 billion in 2009. Imports from Thailand increased much more during the same period from 
US$ 610 million to US$ 2.9 billion. 
 
Under the Singapore CECA, Singapore exempted payment of MFN duty on all export items 
from India, whereas India gave preferential access to about 5,121 items at the 8-digit level. (Table 1 
lists the concessions exchanged under these RTAs.) After CECA came into force in 2005, exports 
increased from US$ 4 billion in 2004 to US$ 7.5 billion in 2009 while imports increased from US$ 
2.6 billion to US$ 6.5 billion during the same period. There has been a decline in trade values in the 
past two years, which again can be explained by the global financial crisis.  
 
The Chile PTA came into effect in 2007. The global financial crisis set in just after that, so in 
the subsequent two years exports to, and imports from Chile saw a decrease. In the case of imports by 
India from Chile, the main reason of the decrease was due to the decrease in copper ore imports, 
which is Chile’s main export item. The dip in the value of copper imports can be attributed to the low 
international price of copper ore since 2007. 
 
Figure 3. India’s exports to bilateral RTA partners 
 
Source: Calculated from data available at the India Trades database.  
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Note: Years refer to 1994/95 to 2009/10 financial periods. 
 
Given the absolute increase in trade following the coming of RTAs into force (except in the 
case of Chile), the question comes to mind of whether or not it was because of the RTAs, i.e., because 
of an increase in trade of items that received preferences? To find the answer, the trade value of 
preferential items have been calculated for each of the RTAs and then compared with the total 
exports/imports under those RTAs, as shown in annex II, figures 1-5. What is interesting is that 
imports of preferential items are driving total imports from RTA partners (note the figures for Sri 
Lanka, Afghanistan and Chile), whereas increased Indian exports to those countries are not due to 
increases in preferential items. It can be said that since India has granted more concessions to its 
partners (as indicated in table 1) within the agreements (except for the Singapore CECA and the Chile 
PTA), this result is not surprising. However, if the agreements are looked at carefully, it becomes 
evident that the RTA partners have been able to gain concessions for the items of interest to them; 
thus, after the RTAs’ entry into force, they have been able to expand exports of such items given the 
tariff preferences. Even in the case of the Chile, which has granted preferences for a greater number of 
items, India is still exporting products that are not covered by such preferences but with which it 
enjoys a comparative advantage. India’s main imports from Chile are copper ore and concentrates, 
which accounted for more than 90 per cent of total imports from Chile in 2006, the year before the 
PTA came to force. In contrast, India’s exports of all the preferential items taken together were 
approximately 50 per cent of the country’s total exports to Chile in the same year. 
 
Figure 4. India’s imports from bilateral RTA partners 
 
 
 Source: Calculated from data available at the India Trades database. 
 Note: Years refer to 1994/95 to 2009/10 financial periods. 
 
Under IAPTA, India has granted Afghanistan preferences for only 23 items at the HS 6-digit 
level. These are items of export interest to Afghanistan, i.e., dried fruit and nuts. In the case of Sri 
Lanka, India received tariff concessions for about 4,000 items, whereas it granted concessions for 
5,000 Sri Lankan products. Almost 96 per cent of current imports from Sri Lanka are preferential 
items whereas only about 40 per cent of India’s current exports are eligible to receive preferences. 
In the case of the Thailand EHS, both countries have a common list of items. Figure 3 of 
annex II clearly shows that Thailand has been able to export a greater volume of such items than 
India, as most of these items are electrical machinery products in which Thailand has a comparative 
advantage. Tables 1-10 in annex III, show that the top imports from India’s RTA partners are mostly  
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preferential items (shaded), whereas few of India’s top exports come under the preferential category 
(the exceptions are the Singapore CECA and the Chile PTA).  It is clear that although India’s exports 
to its RTA partners have increased, it is not because of the RTAs. So the RTAs per se have not been 
useful in helping exporters to increase their share in partner markets. The only exception appears to be 
the Singapore CECA, under which all Indian exports are duty-free and increases in exports may be 
attributable to preferences.  
 
The RTAs may have helped Indian importers. From the figures shown in annex II, it can be 
assumed that the increase in imports from partner countries reflects the increase in imports of 
preferential items. It still has to be assumed that this is due to the RTAs; even though imports of 
preferential items have been the driver of increases in total imports from some of the RTA partners, it 
is still not certain whether such imports are coming with proper CoO and that the importers are 
therefore actually gaining benefits from the preferences under the respective RTAs.  
 
To find the extent of use of preferential schemes by exporters, a primary survey was 
undertaken. The number of CoO issued to exporters annually (figure 5) was found from EIC data. It 
should be noted that the issued CoO listed in the data were requested by exporters for the preferential 
scheme. The data do neither show whether the scheme was finally used by the exporter at the time of 
exporting, nor whether the importing country’s customs authority accepted it. It can be seen that the 
greatest number of applications from exporters was under ISFTA. Given the extensive coverage by 
the agreement, compared to other agreements (except the Singapore CECA whereby all exports from 
India are duty-free), this fact is not surprising. 
 
The next most frequently applied for RTA is APTA, followed closely by SAPTA. Even 
where SAFTA provides more preferences, use of SAPTA was predominant among exporters. 
Compared with the GSP schemes, however, the issue of CoO is much less for all the RTAs taken 
together: of the total number of CoO issued by EIC under different schemes, 96 per cent on an 
average were under the GSP schemes. 
 
Figure 5. Certificates of Origin issued annually by EIC 
   
Source: Calculated from data collected by the EIC primary survey. 
Note: Prior to 2005/06, APTA was called the Bangkok Agreement, which had a very low level of 






The number of annual CoO issued by EIC under ISFTA, the most applied-for RTA route, was 
then compared with the number of export transactions going to Sri Lanka annually. The latter data 
were supplied by DGCI&S, Calcutta. Since the Sri Lankan FTA is the most applied-for RTA, the data 
were collected for Sri Lanka only to gain an idea of the proportion of the most applied-for route in 
total trade transactions with RTA partners. A comparison of the two numbers provides an 
approximation of the extent to which exporters use ISFTA (figure 6). As figure 6 indicates, there is a 
significant gap between total export transactions and export transactions with CoO. 
 
More importantly, there has only been a marginal increase in the issue of CoO (the number of 
transactions with CoO) under ISFTA over the years, even though the total number of transactions has 
increased. In 2008/09, approximately 11 per cent of the total export transactions were issued CoO. 
This can be taken as the upper boundary of utilization by Indian exporters of the ISFTA preferential 
scheme if it is assumed that all CoO issued by EIC under ISFTA are being used by exporters and 
accepted by the Sri Lankan customs authority. However, it cannot be considered as the usual 
utilization ratio, as not all exports to Sri Lanka are covered under ISFTA preferences. (The utilization 
ratio is the percentage of trade going through the preferential route with regard to the product 
coverage of an agreement.) So the 11 per cent figure only gives an approximate idea of how 
frequently exporters use the ISFTA scheme out of the total transactions with Sri Lanka. Like other 
studies with respect to other developing countries (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010; Takahashi and Urata 
2010), this small amount is not surprising as utilization of most RTAs involving developing countries 
is negligible. 
 
Last the data collected on the use of RTA routes (in cases where there is more than one RTA 
under which exports are made to a partner country) is detailed in table 2. For Sri Lanka, ISFTA CoO 
are sought the most by exporters. For Bangladesh, the SAPTA route is more preferred. Although 
SAFTA provides very good product coverage compared to SAPTA, and is on a par with ISFTA, 
Indian exporters make greater use of SAPTA and ISFTA. Maybe RoO are the reason. A comparison 
of RTA usage and their RoO appears to indicate that exporters may choose RTAs based on value 
addition norms; lower value addition requirements, together with coverage by the agreements, may be 
prompting exporters to use a particular RTA when more than one RTA is available with a partner 
country.  
 
Figure 6. Use of Sri Lanka FTA by exporters 
   








Table 2. CoO issued for overlapping RTAs 
  Percentage of CoO issued  RoO criteria* 
For Sri Lanka   
ISLFTA    90  CTH + 35 per cent VA 
SAPTA  9.8  40 per cent VA  
APTA  0.15  50 per cent VA 
SAFTA  0.05  CTH + 40 per cent VA+ PSR 
For Bangladesh 
SAPTA   86  40 per cent VA 
SAFTA   9  CTH + 40 per cent VA + PSR 
APTA  5  50 per cent VA 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Note: CTH = change in tariff heading; VA = value addition (i.e., the percentage of value to be added 
domestically to the export product); and PSR = product specific rules.  




This study was carried out in the context of the recent surge in RTAs in India’s trade policy 
landscape. The focus of the study was whether such RTAs are of use to traders, the ultimate users of 
such schemes. Due to a lack of preferential trade data in official statistics, the study took recourse in 
the alternate route of using the value of each preferential trade item at the HS 6-digit (or 8-digit level 
in some cases) for each of India’s bilateral RTAs, aggregated the values and compared them with the 
value of overall trends in trade. After the RTAs came into effect, both exports and imports from RTA 
partners increased significantly. However, an interesting contrast was found between preferential 
exports and imports – preferential imports were the driving force behind the substantial increase in 
total imports from RTA partners, whereas preferential exports, although increasing in value, did not 
explain the amount of increase in total exports to RTA partners. This indicated that much of the 
increase in post-RTA exports was in non-preferential items and that the RTAs per se were not of any 
great benefit to Indian exporters.  
 
In recent years, India’s top exports, worldwide, have been in gems and jewellery, petroleum 
products,
11 machinery (both electrical and non-electrical), vehicles, iron and steel and their products. 
Many of the items under these headings do not receive preferences under the RTAs. So it is no 
surprise that these items, even though appearing on the negative list of the RTAs, account for a larger 
proportion of total exports under the RTAs. At the same time, most of India’s RTA partners have 
received preferential benefits for those items that are of export interest to them, e.g., spices from Sri 
Lanka,
12 electrical equipment from Thailand, copper ore and concentrates from Chile, and dried fruit 
and nuts from Afghanistan.  
 
The primary survey revealed four important facts: 
(a) GSP is a better preference-giving scheme than all of India’s RTAs put together;  
                                                            
11 In the past few years, there has been a massive increase in India’s export of petroleum oils such as light petroleum oils, 
aviation turbine fuel, high speed diesel etc. 
12 Under the Sri Lanka FTA, huge surges occurred in imports of items such as copper products and vanaspati, which, even 
though not of interest to Sri Lanka at the time of signing the agreement, suddenly became top export items for India in just a 
few years. It was found that Indian businesses had shifted to the island nation to exploit the FTA preferences in these items. 
Corrective steps were taken to stop the huge influx of these items, which was adversely affecting the domestic industry in 
India. Therefore, because of this experience under ISLFTA, more focus should be given to the role of RoO and their proper 
implementation under all RTAs. This is discussed in more detail in Jha, 2010.  
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(b) Among the RTAs, the largest number of CoO are issued under ISFTA, implying exporters 
are using ISFTA more than other RTAs. Given the wide coverage under the agreement, 
this is understandable; 
(c) Even in the case of ISFTA, however, usage by exporters was only 11 per cent of India’s 
total export transactions in 2008/09; 
(d) When more than one RTA is available, exporters choose the RTAs that have lower value-
added norms in the RoO. 
 
Given the skewed preference exchange and the low use of preferences found from the 
analysis in this study, what is now clear is the need to first pause and reflect on the decade-long 
experience with the various RTAs, their effects on trade and their usefulness to Indian traders before 
deciding on the direction of future negotiations. What must be kept in mind is that the usefulness of 
RTAs goes beyond the economic outcome, as Europe’s history in regional integration has proven. 
Also, joining more RTAs may bring long-term dynamic gains. Upgrading FTAs to 
CECAs/CEPAs/CECPAs may also bring more benefits in multiple areas; however, in order to reap all 
such future benefits, careful consideration should be given to the current planning of the agreements. 
Top priority should also be given to ensuring their effective enforcement so as to prevent trade 
malpractice, otherwise they will just become paper agreements with no real usefulness and, in some 
cases, even disutility. 
 
Future research in this area will help to overcome the limitations of this study: a primary 
survey could be carried out at the Indian Customs in order to collect exact data on preferential trade 
with RTA partners. In addition, a primary survey of exporters and importers may help in pin-pointing 
operational problems with RTAs and thus reveal the reason for the low level of usage. The effects of 
RTAs on end-user industries can be explored through industry-specific case studies. A comparative 
study of India’s RTAs with other RTAs will also be of enormous significance from both research and 
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Annex I. Indian RTAs in force (as of May 2011) 
RTA  Signed  Status 
SAARC PTA   April 1993  Started operation in December 1995 
India-Sri Lanka FTA   December 1998  Operating from March 2000  
India-Nepal PTA  March 2002  Operating from March 2002 
India-Afghanistan 
PTA   March 2003  Operating from May 2003 
India-Thailand FTA   October 2003  EHS started in September 2004  
South Asian FTA   January 2004  Supersedes SAPTA; operating from January 2006 
India-MERCOSUR 
PTA   January 2004  Operating from June 2009 
India-Singapore 
CECA
a   June 2005  EHS started in August 2005 
Asia-Pacific  PTA   November 2005  Broader tariff cuts in force from September 2006 
India-Chile PTA   March 2006  Operating from September 2007  
India-Bhutan Trade 
Agreement  July 2006  Operating from July 2006 
India-ASEAN CECA
b   October 2003  FTA in goods came into force in January 2010 
India- Korea CEPA  August 2009  Operating from January 2010 
Source: Author’s compilation from information at the Ministry of Commerce website 
http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta.asp?id=2&trade=i 
 
Notes: (a) In a major policy shift, the Government of India has reportedly decided to convert all 
PTAs/FTAs into Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements (CECAs). Apart from tariff 
concessions on goods, these CECAs will cover preferential relaxation of FDI rules vis-à-vis the 
partner country, tax holidays on investment and income, and easing of visa restrictions. Trade in 
services will also come under the purview of CECAs. (Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreements and Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreements are variants 
of such arrangements.) 
(b) The agreement came into force on 1 January 2010 with regard to Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand. In the case of other ASEAN countries, the agreement will come into force after 









Annex II. Data on exports and imports between India and five trading partners 
 
All figures are drawn from data available at India Trades, a server-based database provided by 
CMIE, which gives India’s trade data. The data period is from prior to the signing of the RTA up to 
2009-2010. The square markers in the figures indicate the year that the agreement came into force. 
 
Annex figure 1. India’s trade with Sri Lanka 
   
 
Annex figure 2. India’s trade with Afghanistan 





Annex figure 3. India’s trade with Thailand 
   
 
Annex figure 4. India’s trade with Singapore 
   
Note: Preferential imports under Singapore here are the 506 items exchanged at the HS 8-
digit level that were given immediate zero duty concessions under the EHS scheme; if all 
5,121 items that are covered under CECA are taken into account, the gap between the two 









Annex figure 5. India’s trade with Chile 
   
 
Annex III. Top 10 export and import products between India and five trading partners 
All tables are calculated from Comtrade data available from World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS) database (http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/). The shaded HS codes in the tables below are 
traded under preferential terms. 
Annex table 1. Top 10 export items to Sri Lanka 
HS Code  Product description 
271019  Other petroleum oils, ATF, HSD etc 
271011  Light petroleum oils 
870321  Cars with cylinder capacity <1000 cc 
720719  Other semi-finished products of iron and non-alloy steel 
871120  Motorcycles with cylinder capacity between 50 cc and 
250 cc 
170199  Other sugar, sugar cubes 
300490  Other medicines, ayurvedic, unani, homeopathic etc. 
740811 Copper  wire 
230400  Oilcake/residue from soya bean extraction 












Annex table 2. Top 10 import items from Sri Lanka 
HS Code  Product description 
151620  Vegetable fats and oils 
854419  Insulated wire, other than copper 
090411  Pepper, neither crushed nor ground 
090700 Cloves 
740319  Other refined copper, unwrought 
230990  Animal feed, other than dog/cat food 
680221 Marble 
400121  Natural rubber in smoked sheets 
470790  Waste and scrap of paper of paper-board, unsorted 
740312  Wire bars of refined copper 
 
Annex table 3. Top 10 export items to Afghanistan 
HS code  Product description 
854140  Photosensitive semiconductor devices
540761  Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn containing ≥85 per cent polyester by 
540710  Woven fabrics obtained from high-tenacity yarn of nylon or other polyesters 
540752  Woven fabrics, dyed 
401120  Tyres used on buses or lorries 
300490  Other medicines, ayurvedic, unani, homeopathic etc. 
300420  Antibiotics other than penicillin 
240399  Other tobacco, chewing, snuff etc. 
090240  Other black tea (fermented)  
020230  Boneless meat of bovine animals, frozen 
Annex table 4. Top 10 import items from Afghanistan 







080211 Almonds, fresh or dried, in shell
090940 Seeds of caraway
081340 Other fruit, dried
080719 Melons, other than watermelons
 
Annex table 5. Top 10 export items to Thailand 
HS code  Product description 
710239 Diamonds, non-industrial, cut/worked but not mounted or 
740311 Cathodes and sections of cathodes of refined copper 
230400 Oilcake and other solid residues
720110 Non-alloy pig iron
271019 Other petroleum oils, ATF, HSD etc.






294200 Other organic compounds
 
Annex table 6. Top 10 import items from Thailand 
HS code  Product description 
840820 Engines for vehicles, other than railway or tramway 
847170  Storage units of automatic data processing machines 
852812  Reception apparatus for colour televisions 
760120  Aluminium alloys 
400121  Natural rubber in smoked sheets 
841510  Air-conditioning machines, window or wall types 
720421  Waste and scrap stainless steel 
390740  Polycarbonates 
590210  Textile fabrics of nylon or other polyamides, for 
870899  Other parts and accessories of motor vehicles 
 
Annex table 7. Top 10 export items to Singapore 
HS code  Product description 
271019 Other petroleum oils, ATF, HSD etc.
271011  Light oils and preparations; motor spirit 
760110  Aluminium, not alloyed 
890590  Floating docks, platforms etc. 
890190  Other vessels for transportation of goods and persons 
890520  Floating or submersible drilling/production platforms 
710239  Diamonds, non-industrial, cut/worked but not mounted 
740311  Cathodes and sections of cathodes of refined copper 
711319  Jewellery articles of other precious metal, 
290220  Benzene 
 
Annex table 8. Top 10 import items from Singapore 
HS code  Product description 
271019 Other petroleum oils, ATF, HSD etc.
490700  Unused postage, revenue or similar stamps 
290250  Styrene 
847330  Parts and accessories of the automatic data processing 
847150  Digital processing units  
890190  Other vessels for transportation of goods and persons 
847130  Laptops, palmtops etc. 
847170  Storage units of automatic data processing machines 
271011  Light oils and preparations; motor spirit 












Annex table 9. Top 10 export items to Chile 
HS code  Product description 
870321  Motor vehicles of cylinder capacity more than 1,000 cc 
420329  Gloves and mittens of leather 
283329  Sulphates  
850423  Electrical transformers having power handling capacity 
of >10,000 kva 
300490  Other medicines, ayurvedic, unani, homeopathic etc. 
401120  Tyres used on buses or lorries 
630492  Other furnishing articles of cotton, not knitted or 
crocheted 
294200  Other organic compounds 
721049  Other products of iron/non-alloy steel, plaited or coated 
with zinc 
551511  Polyester fabrics, mixed with viscose rayon staple 
fibres 
 
Annex table 10. Top eight import items from Chile 
HS code  Product description 
260300  Copper ores and concentrates 
261310  Molybdenum ores and concentrates 
280120  Iodine 
080810  Apples, fresh 
480100  Newsprint, in rolls and sheets 
282520  Lithium oxide and hydroxide 
283691  Lithium carbonates 
252890  Natural boric acid and calcium borates 
Note: The top eight items only are reported for import from Chile as other 
imports are very low in value. 
 